Commercial Calamities: An Introduction and Sermon by Garvin, Larry T.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 68, NUMBER 1, 2007
Commercial Calamities:
An Introduction and Sermon
LARRY T. GARVIN*
Like most good ideas (and, gauging from reality TV, most bad ones),
this symposium has its roots in someone else's innovation.' This knock-off
was inspired by Constitutional Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies, a
collection of essays edited by Bill Eskridge and Sandy Levinson. 2 This
collection comprises about forty essays from a galaxy of constitutional stars,
each discussing pithily and wittily some constitutional provision or case that
seems particularly silly, careless, or noxious. A fine idea, nicely executed,
and well worth attention from the commercial lawyer in search of blended
amusement and instruction. Indeed, the idea is so good that it seemed a pity
to waste it on the constitutionalists, and the executive committee of the
AALS Section on Commercial and Related Consumer Law agreed. Hence
this symposium, in which a dozen and a half distinguished commercial law
academics3 go on the rampage, flailing away at approaches, doctrines, cases,
or structures that they find irksome, perplexing, foolish, or just plain pig-
ignorant. Most, to be sure, are too polite to uncase their bludgeons, variously
preferring scalpels or feather pillows as their means of attack. Others show
no restraint, perhaps to the relief of the reader eager to see Llewellyn's blood
spattered on the pavement. 4
Arranging these essays has been rather a challenge. With as varied a
collection as this, the task is rather like choosing among a kaleidoscope's
images-a slight twist, and we behold a new arrangement, as attractive as its
* Professor, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University. My
thanks to the other members of the Executive Committee of the AALS Section of
Commercial and Related Consumer Law--Carl Bjerre, Christina Kunz, Gregory Maggs,
Juliet Moringiello, Keith Rowley, and Linda Rusch-for approving this project and
helping to select the participants.
This is the spot for the obligatory Newton quote: "If I have seen further it is by
standing on the shoulders of giants." For a combined tour deforce andjeu d'esprit (thus
exhausting my French vocabulary) devoted to this phrase, see-now!-ROBERT K.
MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965).
2 CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
3 And this author.
4 A bit late for that, but never mind.
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predecessor and, alas, as its imminent successor. We have taken modest
refuge in the increasing irrelevance of arrangement; though we hope that
copies of this issue will adorn the bookcases of commercial law mavens
nationwide, in these days of downloading it seems more likely that readers
will proceed a la carte rather than with our prix fixe meal. Still, there is
something to be said for an attempt at narrative, even if ultimately factitious.
The symposium is thus arranged more or less thematically in hopes that
articles on common topics will illumine each other. We start with general
discussions of the Uniform Commercial Code as something other than a
great realist document (Professor Snyder) 5-or, indeed, as something other
than uniform, commercial, or a code (Professor Burnham) 6. Then comes
analysis of particular commercial excrescences, more or less in Code order.
First in line is sales law, in which we include the general law of contract. So,
then, we meet Professor Scott's demolition of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores7-
in particular, of how we use it in the academy, and how it warps our
understanding of pre-contractual obligation. We find Professor Goldberg
hacking away at the common understanding of another classic, Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,8 and the related treatment of output and
requirements contracts in Article 2. 9 Professor Braucher takes on Amended
Article 2's electronic commerce provisions, showing how they are at best
unnecessary and at worst confusing and mischievous. 10 This portion of the
symposium closes with Professor Cross's discussion of parol evidence in the
CISG, and how the common understanding of the role of domestic law in
this area is misguided. "
On to payments and then secured credit (including bankruptcy). The law
of notes? A disaster, says Professor Cohen. 12 The law of NSF fees? A
5 Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11 (2007).
6 Scott J. Burnham, Is Article 2 Regulatory or Facilitatory? A Socratic Dialogue, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 57 (2007).
7 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the
Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2007).
8 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); Victor P. Goldberg, Desperately Seeking
Consideration: The Unfortunate Impact of UC.C. Section 2-306 on Contract
Interpretation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 103 (2007).
9 U.C.C. § 2-306 (2001).
10 Jean Braucher, Under the Surrounding Circumstances: Amended Article 2's
Redundant (or Worse) Electronic Commerce Provisions, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (2007).
11 Karen Halverson Cross, Parol Evidence Under the CISG: The "Homeward
Trend" Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 133 (2007).
12 Neil B. Cohen, The Calamitous Law of Notes, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (2007).
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disgrace, says Professor White. 13 And beyond these specific issues,
Professor Maggs contends that payments law in the Code is chockablock
with false promises and mistaken assumptions, containing many rules that
bear no relation to the rules that actually govern payments transactions. 14
Secured credit fares no better. Professor Mooney attacks both the process
that gave rise to the "consumer compromise" in Article 9 and its substance,
including, as a little bonus, the text of an op-ed piece that he wrote in
opposition-perforce anonymously, as he was co-reporter for the draft
article. 15 Professors Plank and Schwarcz both address rights to payment in
commercial law. Professor Plank takes a broad view, doubting the wisdom of
placing the sale of receivables within Article 9 at all. 16 Professor Schwarcz
looks particularly at a most controversial piece of litigation, In re
Commercial Money Center, Inc.,17 and the general topic of the automatic
perfection of the sale of payment intangibles, finding both at best misguided
and indeed commercially surprising and bizarre.' 8 Another notorious case, In
re Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co.,19 incurs Professor LoPucki's wrath, as in his
view it undermines the entire structure of the Article 9 filing system.20 And
Professor Rasmussen goes after the Supreme Court and its decision in Till v.
SCS Credit Corp.,21 in which the Court managed at once to avoid setting out
a simple rule of decision and display a basic lack of commitment to the
needs of commercial law.22
We close as we started, with some more general treatments of
commercial law. Professor Hillman gives us a primer on creating
commercial calamities, using Article 2's treatment of modifications as his
13 James J. White, NSF Fees, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 185 (2007).
14 Gregory E. Maggs, A Complaint About Payment Law Under the U.C.C.: What
You See Is Often Not What You Get, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 201 (2007).
15 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Consumer Compromise in Revised U C.C. Article 9:
The Shame ofIt All, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 215 (2007).
16 Thomas E. Plank, Assignment of Receivables Under Article 9: Structural
Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (2007).
17 Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Netbank, FSB (In re Commercial Money
Ctr., Inc.), 2005 WL 1365055 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 350 B.R. 465 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2006).
18 Steven L. Schwarcz, Automatic Perfection of Sales of Payment Intangibles: A
Trap for the Unwary, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 273 (2007).
19 412 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2005).
20 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Spearing Tool Filing System Disaster, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
281 (2007).
21 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
22 Robert K. Rasmussen, Creating a Calamity, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 319 (2007).
2007]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
exemplar. 23 In contrast, Professor Boss looks to the internationalization of
commercial law, which she finds potentially both a danger to domestic
commercial lawmaking and a guide to its future invigoration.24 Finally ...
well, more on the last essay later.
Now comes the hard part-to lay out the overarching themes of this olla
podrida. The image of the kaleidoscope once again comes to mind. With so
many authors writing from such different vantages, no one theme knits
everything together. One can use several themes, but that achieves thematic
completeness at the cost of thematic concision. Perhaps a different approach
is in order. Alfred North Whitehead famously said that "all knowledge is a
footnote to Plato."'25 We might adapt that slightly to our ends, saying that
"all commercial law is a footnote to Llewellyn." With that in mind, I propose
to take a few words of Llewellyn with which he summed up the Realist
approach to law and show how these essays point to recent departures from
Llewellyn's model. By doing so, perhaps we can look more broadly at how
commercial calamities come into being and what we can do to avoid them,
all in a manner consistent with the jural underpinnings of the Code.26
The text for this scholastic sermon is drawn from The Common Law
Tradition, Llewellyn's magisterial study of appellate judging.27 This
characteristically ends with a series of untidy appendices, the second of
which has the very Llewellynesque title, "Realism, the Genesis of This
Book, the Treasure of the Law Reports for Behavioral Science, Things This
Book Does Not Do and Some Points of Method." In this appendix Llewellyn
lays out in four telegraphic phrases what he sees as the essence of Realist
method: "see it fresh," "see it clean," "see it as it works," and "come back to
make sure."'28 Let us consider these in sequence, relating each to the
symposium contributions and drawing what lessons we may for the
development of commercial law.
"See it fresh." Here Llewellyn wanted us to look at legal problems as
23 Robert A. Hillman, How To Create a Commercial Calamity, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 335
(2007).
24 Amelia H. Boss, The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code Process in an
Increasingly International World, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 349 (2007).
25 That is what Whitehead famously said. Unfortunately, it is not what he actually
said. The quote is thus: "The safest general characterization of the European
philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." ALFRED NORTH
WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 63 (1929). Whitehead annoyingly sacrificed pith for
accuracy. I prefer the bastardized version in the text, though, and there it rests.
26 Though Professor Snyder would doubtless disagree.
2 7 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
28 Id. at 510. Professor Snyder properly places three of these in the epigraph to his
contribution, and a good thing, too. See Snyder, supra note 5, at 12.
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though we had never seen them before. A fresh look might cause us to affirm
the familiar, but it might also cause us to abandon it for a sounder, more
functional approach. Llewellyn's crusade against the omnipresence of title in
commercial law is a case in point.29 Several of our calamities result from
unwillingness to jettison archaic concepts or ways of thinking. Professor
Cohen's attack on the law of notes, for example, rests greatly on the Code's
curious continuation of commercial anachronisms in this important area.
Professor Hillman's tongue-in-cheek guide on how to create a calamity uses
the law of modifications as a text, in which the drafters of Article 2 sought at
once to move forward and backward, with an ungainly split resulting.
Professor Boss more politely shows that a fresh transnational law process
has some dangers, but also some potential advantages, for American
commercial law reformers.
Llewellyn's maxim remains vital, though in practice difficult to effect in
commercial law. It is easier to think afresh in areas seldom relied upon, for
there will be few settled expectations to upend. In commercial law any
attempt at wholesale reform will likely be met with cries of "needless
tinkering," to take one constant refrain from the Article 2 revision process.
These cries could safely be ignored were they not sometimes merited.
Statutory change can yield uncertainty, even if the change is in the end
salutary, and uncertainty in turn yields cost to those who seek to plan.
Moreover, even when this charge is unthinking or pretextual, it can be
effective. Uniform state law is an oxymoron, and one that lends itself to
manipulation by interest groups. By credibly threatening opposition and thus
non-uniform enactment, an interest group can derail law reform or at least
force accommodation. 30 This is particularly worrying for the U.C.C., the
greatest success of the Uniform Law Commissioners and a model of uniform
enactment.
On the other hand, incremental change, though easier, may give rise to
ungainly and ultimately unworkable statutes. Indeed, by repairing one hole
the statutory tinker may open another. The history of the "battle of the
forms" provision in sales law, U.C.C. section 2-207, is an all too familiar
illustration, with many hands trying to fix perceived problems and in the end
29 K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. REV.
159, 165-91 (1938).
30 A familiar point in the literature. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996);
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Christopher J.S. Termini, Note, Return on Political Investment:
The Puzzle of Ex Ante Investment in Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C, 92 VA. L. REV. 1023,
1029-36 (2006).
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creating a statutory disaster.31 Even if the statute makes no mistakes, it can
become unwieldy and unworkable save by the clerisy. One might point to the
greatly increased length of Revised Article 9. Possibly the only way to "see
it fresh" in commercial law is to harness an enlightened interest group, if
such there be, in an attempt to do so.
"See it clean." This maxim is related to the one above. If we are to "see
it fresh" by looking at a problem without preconceptions, we are also to "see
it clean" by brushing aside current legal impedimenta. Following current
forms, even if they work in another context, may yield calamity. So, for
example, Professor Braucher points out that bringing some, but not all, of the
electronic commerce provisions from the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act into Article 2 is variously redundant and harmful, with the particular
context making their adaptation at times positively mischievous. On a loftier
plane, Professor Burnham shows how careless thinking about the U.C.C. can
yield misconceptions, such as a hasty assumption that non-commercial
transactions are outside its scope. Similarly, Professor Snyder attacks our
common understanding that the Code is fundamentally a realist document, an
understanding which encourages basic errors in Code analysis.
"See it as it works." This may be the most important of Llewellyn's
maxims when applied to the codification of commercial law. Certainly
Llewellyn thought it vital that commercial law be drafted with commercial
practice firmly in mind.32 When practice departs from the statute, or when
drafters ignore practice, opportunities for calamity burgeon. In this
symposium, many essays turn precisely on a failure to "see it as it works."
Professor Cross shows that we do not understand how parol evidence works
in international transactions or across legal systems. Professor Goldberg
criticizes our comprehension of how output and requirements contracts
actually work. Professor Maggs points out the frequent unreality of
payments law when set next to payments practice. Professor White shows
how NSF charges bear no relation to the cost of collection, and how the law
ignores this important imbalance. From differing perspectives, Professors
Plank, Schwarcz, LoPucki, and Rasmussen shoot at the law of secured credit
and bankruptcy, mainly by pointing out its ignorance of the systems
undergirding the world of finance and the resulting disasters that arise when
courts or lawmakers act or fail to act.
31 For one colorful account, see Letter from Grant Gilmore, Professor, Vermont Law
School, to Robert S. Summers, Professor, Cornell University Law School (Sept. 10,
1980), in James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 723,
723-25.
32 Whether he managed this or not is another matter. For a balanced discussion of
Llewellyn's aspirations and accomplishments in this vein, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 188-96, 313-21 (1973).
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This should not be a problem with commercial law reform. One of the
great virtues of the Uniform Law Commissioners is its variety. With a wide
range of practitioners, judges, and academics from across the nation, it can
bring many perspectives to bear on its products. For any potential problem,
one would imagine that some commissioner will have pertinent experience
to share with a drafting committee or the group as a whole, which ideally
should cause rethinking and revision where a statute fails to take practice
into account. Sometimes this does happen, even in this author's brief
experience as a Commissioner. Not always, though; given the wide range of
legal issues that may be implicated by a commercial statute, it is entirely
possible that no Commissioner will have first-hand knowledge of how a
problem works in practice. Of course, those in the affected fields have
powerful incentives to bring their concerns to the drafting committees, but
from the vantage of advocates, not disinterested seekers of truth.
One solution might be to give each drafting committee the resources to
develop context on its own. When issues arise in committee meetings, often
no one is certain what the state of the law is or whether a vivid scenario
bears any relation to fact. The usual drafting committee venue-a hotel
meeting room-does not lend itself to careful inquiry. The committee could
ask the reporter to do research and return at the next meeting, but the
reporter has a full plate merely with drafting. In any event, deferring
decisions to the next meeting is a recipe for stasis. I have suggested
elsewhere that greater use of electronic communication and funding for
research would improve the quality of uniform laws.33 This fits neatly within
Llewellyn's preferred model, and should help make statutes more realistic
(as well as more Realist).
Many of these problems are with courts, though, and there systemic
solutions are harder to muster. Possibly continuing judicial education needs
to take the concerns of commercial lawyers more into account, whether by
introducing generalist judges to new transaction types or by bringing trends
in commercial law more plainly to the attention of the bench. The
specialized courts found in some jurisdictions might be another way to bring
greater situation-sense, to use Llewellyn's phrase, to bear on sophisticated
commercial problems.34 (Our main specialized commercial courts, the
bankruptcy courts, are, however, not immune from this sort of error, as
Professor Schwarcz observes.)
"Come back to make sure." This last comment is a little delphic. It may
simply mean that the good Realist is careful, always checking his or her
33 Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 352-54 (1999).
34 LLEWELLYN, supra note 27, at 60, 122, 127.
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work as our grade-school teachers taught. More likely, though, it means that
one cannot relax even after one has done one's work well; one must always
come back to make sure that the job remains well done. Even the best laws
need periodic review, lest the world pass them by at whatever cost for
detours. Professor Mooney's comment fits better with the first reading; the
ad hoc redrafting of Revised Article 9's consumer provisions lacked the
levels of review that good uniform lawmaking would provide, and led, in
Professor Mooney's view, to unfortunate results. Professor Scott's analysis
of Hoffman and the treatment of pre-contractual obligation in Contracts
courses illustrates the second point. Perhaps at one time Hoffman epitomized
the common law's treatment of pre-contractual obligation. No longer,
though. Even Hoffman has largely been limited to its facts in its own state,
and, as Professor Scott has shown, it has proved unimportant elsewhere.
Other bodies of law do give rise to pre-contractual liability, but draw far less
attention in Contracts casebooks. This educational inertia-the failure to
"come back to make sure" that this accurately reflects the legal world-
disserves law students and thus the new generation of practitioners.
It is easy to say that those who make and study the law should constantly
check themselves against both error and obsolescence. It is harder to make
certain that we actually do this. Thanks to the UCC Reporting Service it is
not difficult to keep abreast of the case law, and there is not so much
scholarly literature that one is overwhelmed with the reading. Keeping up
with changes in commerce is more of a challenge for those who do not
represent those who make the changes. Possibly those of us in the academy
should make more of an effort to read trade journals, legal and business
alike, and attend bar conferences to keep current, just as practitioners might
reasonably keep an eye on the scholarly literature. For law reform, one
imagines that those affected by commercial law will let it be known if aging
law stands in the way of modem practice. A more interesting, if probably
undesirable, possibility is periodic review of statutes, whether by legislatures
under sunset provisions or by courts, as proposed by Judge Calabresi and
Senator Davies.35 The need for stability in commercial law argues against
sunset provisions, and the limited ability of courts to find facts freely argues
against free revision. Periodic review by independent bodies, such as state
law revision commissions or NCCUSL itself, might be salutary, and the
Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC might reasonably be given the task
of periodic, systematic review of the whole of commercial law.
One essay, alas, does not fit this tidy arrangement. The odd essay out-
35 GuiDo CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Jack
Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L.
REv. 203, 204-05 (1979).
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the destroyer of our classical symmetry-is, I abashedly admit, mine.36 It is
in the back so that it will mar the structure as little as possible. Perhaps
fewer readers will get to it, which is probably to the good. But it does raise
an issue that should worry us all, whether we are academics, judges, or
practitioners: the decline of commercial law in the academy. In a way, this
symposium would seem to prove the essay wrong; it fairly swarms with
contributions from superb academic commercial lawyers. Nor should this be
the last symposium of its kind. But the next to last? The third from last?
Perhaps, for reasons best left to this symposium's ultimate crotchety
effusion.
With that, we leave you to the symposium. We hope it provokes-well,
some combination of laughter, annoyance, contemplation, and maybe even
reform, both of commercial lawmaking and of the legal academy. Enjoy.
36 Larry T. Garvin, The Strange Death of Academic Commercial Law, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 403 (2007).
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